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his limitations. Yet, the malaria problem
would prove to be a task worthy of Ross's
relentless search for approval. Quite apart
from being a stubborn obstacle to British
colonialism in India and elsewhere, the
plasmodia had become an international
phenomenon. It offered Ross a stage for
recognition. It also brought Ross and
Manson together.
While on furlough in the spring of 1894,
Ross solicited Manson's advice when
researching his essay for the Parkes Prize
competition on 'Malarial fevers: their cause
and prevention'. Manson, who served on
the selection committee, recruited Ross by
stroking his ego with personal gestures of
approval. These ranged from invitations to
lunch, references to books, demonstrating
how to detect the protozoa microscopically,
to sharing his mosquito-malaria theory in
advance ofpublication. Even before Ross
returned to India, the search for "the beast
in the mosquito" had become a consuming
preoccupation.
As the new collection of letters between
Ross and Manson richly shows, the
complexity of the mosquito-malaria
relationship required not only a resourceful
autodidact but also a flawed personality to
follow the theory to its conclusion.
Organized chronologically, William Bynum
and Caroline Overy have mercifully let Ross
and Manson speak in their own words.
While the editors do not intrude on the
text, they do provide as much context as the
reader demands. In addition to a sensible
introduction, they furnish a serviceable
glossary of technical terms, informative
footnotes, a thorough biographical
appendix of the men of science referred to
in the letters, and an extensive
bibliographical appendix. As a resource for
the history ofdiscovery, this compelling
volume ofcorrespondence will surely
interest the professional scholar and lay
reader alike.
Douglas M Haynes,
University ofCalifornia, Irvine
John Sutton, Philosophy and memory
traces: Descartes to connectionism,
Cambridge University Press, 1998, pp. xvii,
372, illus., £40.00, $69.95 (0-521-59194-5).
It is common for writers on cognitive
science and neuroscience to deploy
historical statements, especially about
Descartes, as part of a rhetorical strategy to
expose confusion and error. Most such
writers are actually indifferent or even
antagonistic to history as disciplined
knowledge. This book is different. It
contributes to the modern philosophy and
science ofmind by arguing that distributed
processing theories of memory are not
vulnerable to the criticisms of philosophers
opposed to connectionist accounts of
mental representations as traces. But it also
seeks a "historical cognitive science ... to
demonstrate that it is possible to attend to
contexts and brains at once" (p. 1). To
attain these ends, John Sutton makes a
huge excursus through the early modern
theory of the animal spirits, memory and
the self. The result is a thickly detailed
dialogue with intellectual history, and it will
engage scholars, including medical
historians, concerned with animal spirits.
Sutton argues that the animal spirits,
maligned by modern scientists as a brake on
scientific physiology, both permitted an
appreciation of memory as a form of
distributed processing and mediated social
values in the mind. To make these views
plausible, he goes in depth into the
interpretation of Descartes, John Locke,
David Hartley, Thomas Reid, and other
(predominantly English-language) authors
on mind from the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries. He is intensively
involved with Descartes scholarship, now
extremely complex on mind-body questions.
This book therefore ambitiously engages
modern philosophy and science, and
intellectual history, and it references a vast
secondary and philosophical literature,
which anyone wishing to say anything
authoritative about Descartes or Locke now
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has to negotiate. Sutton is persuasive:
knowledge of modern distributive
processing, but more especially attention to
mechanisms of memory, can make a
difference to historical interpretation. He
also argues that history can make a
difference to modem theories; but here the
outcome is not so clear.
The book is extremely scholarly and
detailed, and perhaps readers will focus on
particular parts, as the author makes
possible. There is an overall problem of
presentation, as the author is aware: much
of the argument is essentially
negative-theories ofperception and
especially memory as associated
representations do not have the failings
critics attribute to them. The book therefore
cites and converses at length with what
others have said, and the key arguments
tend to get repeated rather than deepened.
Pruning would have made the argument
tighter for readers who do not share the
author's enthusiasms.
Sutton is firmly in the camp of those who
believe philosophy and science cannot be
kept separate in modem approaches to
mind, and who accept a materialism
eliminating reference to a central self or
controlling mental agency. At the same
time, however, unusually, he is concemed
that these stances, in their current forms,
fail to incorporate a social and cultural
dimension that is constitutive, equally with
the brain, of human existence. He aspires to
use history to bring the absent dimension
into modem cognitivist science, in the way,
he argues, animal spirit theories embedded a
social dimension in belief about mind. This
is an imaginative intellectual step; I felt,
however, that the author does not in
practice deliver. His extended analysis shows
enthusiasm for cognitivism, not theories of
the social.
Does the book succeed in "the active use
of history in bringing culture into science"
(p. 2). Certainly, Sutton does not use history
to ask about the ways in which modern
cognitivism might itself be context
dependent. He contextualizes the animal
spirits to the extent of pointing out that
what sustained commitment to them was
not so much evidence-the spirits were
widely thought to be problematic on such
grounds-but their capacity to represent the
passions, the turbulence of Fallen Man. The
spirits, far from being favoured because
they mechanically held ordered memory
traces, were so because they represented the
disorder that requires a controlling agent to
maintain order and responsibility. Yet he
debates texts not contexts in the past. And
when it comes to present science, it is what
is "true" about the mind that sustains his
interest. He does not point to present moral
philosophy, political economy or religious
belief, as presupposed in current ways of
life, as a context for cognitivism. There
appears to be asymmetry rather than
symmetry in his comparison of theories of
the animal spirits and modem theories. The
direct examination of how the social
contributes to the constitution ofmind, on
which, after all, sociology, linguistics,
anthropology, and social psychology, as well
as history, have had much to say, might
lead him down routes where he does not
want to go.
There are signs that claims about the
social dimension are left vague in the
hope of establishing an approach to
cognitive science "with an eye to society
and history" (p. 277). The treatment of
metaphor is one example. Sutton notes
the richness of metaphor in animal spirit
theories, but seems to think metaphorical
statements can finally be separated from
scientific statements, thus isolating modem
science from one way in which it might
be possible to explore a social dimension
in its truth claims. With an audience of
philosophers or cognitivists in mind, he
feels constrained to ask, "What use is all
this history?" (p. 149), showing how far
there is to go before modem scientists
accept that history might be essential to
knowledge of human beings. One question
about culture which Sutton avoids, like
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other writers driven by the agendas of
cognitive neuroscience, is the meaning of
reference to "psychology",
"neurophilosophy", or "neuroscience" in
the early modern period. In spite of the
enormous attention to historical
scholarship, books like this one have no
intention of being side-tracked by the
question whether the categories in terms
of which we assemble knowledge are
themselves historical constructs. Ultimately,
this book takes the modern scientist's view
that real knowledge is knowledge of
brains, not culture. How historical
meaning relates to the modem world of
scientific meaning may be a more
problematic question than even this deeply
informed book allows.
Roger Smith,
Moscow
Faye Getz, Medicine in the English middle
ages, Princeton University Press, 1998, pp.
xiv, 174, £21.95, $32.50 (0-691-08522-6).
This book demonstrates the tension that
currently exists in medical historiography
between a conventional, Whiggish approach
to the "rise of the professional medical
doctor" and a realization that other
theoretical approaches have rather more to
offer in terms of the understanding of
medicine within the context of particular
times and cultures. In her preface, Faye
Getz refers to the anthropological work of
Levi-Strauss who argued that the medical
practitioner "did not become a great
shaman because he cured his patients; he
cured his patients because he had become a
great shaman" (p. xi). This promises an
interesting new approach to the study of the
healer in medieval society, but she goes on
in a more conventional fashion: "[m]edical
learning in medieval England from about
750 to about 1450 is the focus of this book,
and the central argument concerns how this
learning, understood as the medicine that
was written down in texts, gained an
audience among English people. The
struggles of learned physicians to establish a
reputation for themselves and for their
medicine ... and ... to develop an audience
for medical learning, especially among the
elite of later medieval English culture"
(pp. xi-xii) indicate the primary focus on
academic medicine and elite patrons.
The main text opens with a vignette of
the death of Hubert Walter, Archbishop of
Canterbury (d. 1205), while attended by two
physicians, one ofwhom, Gilbertus
Anglicus, is the subject of a previous study
by Faye Getz. She argues that Gilbertus'
role at the sick man's bedside was not to
save his life, but to use his skills, including
his knowledge of astrology, to "recognize
that death was unavoidable, and that the
life of a great man must be shepherded to
its end with ritual and dignity" (p. 4). Thus
Gilbertus confines himself to advising the
Archbishop on when to make his
confession, his will, and to receive the last
rites.
This intriguing, though problematic,
image of the physician as the non-medical
determiner of fate and smoother of the
passage of the soul, has potential for
resolving problems which have traditionally
faced understanding of clerical involvement
in medicine. However, at this point the
analysis is not developed. The nod to
anthropological theory having been made,
the rest of the book is a far more
conventional discussion ofthe range of
practitioners working in England, the
growth of academic medicine, the range of
texts created by English authors, and the
emergence (she argues) of the Galenic
"regimen of health" as the preferred and
non-medical form of health care by the elite
and their physicians. This is frustrating as
issues which she regards as problems, such
as the paucity ofgraduates in medicine and
the frequency with which non-medically
trained graduates practised physic on the
elite, or the willingness of families to
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